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INDONESIA: FROM SUHARTO TO DEMOCRACY? 
Bob Lowry 
'Even despots do not deny the merits of freedom; only they wish to keep 
it for themselves, claiming that no one else is worthy of it' 
(Alexis de Tocqueville 1856/1955:xv). 
Indonesia is on the verge of political transition. But to where? According 
to Francis Fukuyama (1992) Indonesia is headed towards liberal 
democracy; other observersl are less optimistic. 
The factors which bring about change have been identified in 
general terms by Huntington (1991) and others. But the circumstances of 
each society confound attempts to predict with any certainty the direction 
and timing of transition. This does not mean that useful deductions 
cannot be made. As de Tocqueville (1856) revealed in his study of the 
Old Regime in France, the conditions which led to the French Revolution 
did not appear overnight but evolved and were there to be observed over 
a period of time. Louis XVI or his predecessors could have modified 
those conditions, causing French history to take a different course. It 
took the conjunction of particular conditions at a particular point in time 
and the variables of human nature to create the outcomes that occurred. 
It is thus impossible to predict in any detail the course of transition in 
Indonesia. It is possible, however, to give some idea of the main 
directions and timing that Indonesia's transition might take. 
This paper broadly accepts Fukuyama's equation of human 
progress with the movement towards liberal democracy, and employs the 
factors identified by Huntington (1991) in his comparative study of 'the 
third wave of democratisation' to indicate where Indonesia stands in 
relation to this progress. Specifically, it considers: where does Indonesia 
stand on the continuum from authoritarianism to liberal democracy? The 
concept of transition or progress implies propulsion; where is that 
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propulsion corning from and how dynamic and cohesive is it? And what 
barriers are likely to be encountered along the continuum? 
Background 
Almost from the beginning of the nationalist movement early this 
century, Indonesian society has been trying to reconcile three concepts 
of progress: liberal democracy, communism and Islam. Ironically, many 
early nationalists were inspired by the history of the struggle of the 
Dutch themselves to win their freedom from Spanish rule (Sirnatupang 
1991 :24) as well as by events closer to home, such as Japan's def eat of 
Russia in 1905. The pre-World War Two nationalist movement was not 
allowed to gather widespread support but gave rise to a political elite. 
The questions which most taxed the nationalist cause were: how was 
independence to be won and what form of regime was the new state to 
adopt? Colonial power was broken by the Second World War and the 
subsequent Revolution which thwarted attempts to reassert colonial rule. 
The form of the regime to replace colonial rule was more contentious. 
Since the Netherlands East Indies was 85 per cent Muslim it is not 
surprising that there were proponents of an Islamic state. There were, 
however, three fundamental arguments against such a proposal. First, 
many of the most ~pr~rninent early nationalists were Dutch-educated and 
influenced -by t he political currents then circulating in Europe, 
particularly liberal democracy (especially its socialist stream) and 
communism. Religion was treated as an historical hangover and an 
obstacle to social progress by communists or part of the personal and 
social domain by the liberals. Nevertheless, Indonesia's secular leaders, 
whether personally religious or not, could not ignore Islam as a political 
force. Secondly, the progress of Islam in Indonesia had been impeded by 
the resistance of preceding civilizations and by colonial policy. The 
syncretic nature of Islam in some regions of Indonesia diluted 
enthusiasm for the literal application of Islamic law. Thirdly, although 
the non-Muslim minority was small it was comparatively well educated 
and organized and well represented in the independence movement. It 
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was also geographically concentrated, particularly in Eastern Indonesia, 
and might have sought secession from an Islamic state. 
There were also demands for a communist state. However, 
communism could not gather enough strength to overcome the 
combined forces of Islam, Christianity and the secular supporters of 
liberal democracy. The Communist Rebellions of 1926 and 1948, for 
example, were quickly crushed. 
This left liberal democracy, which was adopted as an expedient in 
1945, partly to curry support from the allies (Legge 1972). After the 
Revolution, communism reemerged as a political force and Islam 
remained influential but fragmented. However, the liberal democratic 
structures adopted in 1945 were eventually overwhelmed by the tide of 
ideological conflict, the daunting task of providing good government 
and satisfying inflated expectations with the means available, and lack of 
commitment to the norms of democracy (Feith 1962). 
In 1959 President Sukarno, who had been frustrated by his 
exclusion from executive power since 1945, decreed the reinstitution of 
the 1945 Constitution, which provided for an executive presidency, and 
created 'Guided Democracy' under his tutelage. Guided Democracy was 
poorly institutionalized and relied on Sukarno to balance the competing 
forces of communism, the army and the discredited remnants of the 
other political parties. The volatile and personalized nature of Guided 
Democracy led inevitably to its demise in the 1965 coup d'etat and the 
aftermath of the coup. 
Guided Democracy was replaced by another authoritarian regime 
gradually dominated by the personality of President Suharto, the 
enduring head of an alliance of elite interests termed the 'New Order'. 
Suharto has built a structure of state power which has proven stable and 
enduring. His personal dominance of these structures of political power 
and his unwillingness to contemplate political reform is such that no 
fundamental transition is likely to occur before he departs office. 
That is not to say that there is no opposition to the New Order, only 
that it has not been allowed to grow or cohere to the point where it could 
overpower the status quo. Neither is the Suharto regime moribund; it has 
its own vision of progress. The objective of the ideological construct that 
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is Pancasila Democracy is summed up in the term 'the complete 
Indonesian' (Manusia Indonesia Seutuhnya), which can be defined as a 
polity which accepts the structures and norms as defined by the regime. 
In return the regime pledges to bring economic development and 
prosperity to all Indonesians. This construct has three interrelated 
objectives: to preserve the privileges of Suharto and his supporters, to 
raise living standards generally, and to preserve the unity of the nation 
within current geographic boundaries. 
While Suharto remains president it is unlikely that fundamental 
change in the nature of the regime will be contemplated.2 His successor, 
however, is unlikely to have the same unquestioned authority and will be 
open to pressures from a number of sources. Global economic forces will 
provide an imperative for reform. The elite will be jostling for a 
redistribution of patronage. The middle class will be seeking more open 
political structures, and all will be seeking mass support for their causes. 
The role of the army in this situation will be critical. 
Succession 
The presidential succession will be a crucial event for several reasons. 
{ First, it will be only the second succession since 1945. The first 
succession was the result of a 'disguised coup' (Crouch 1988) and 
although there are constitutional and procedural rules for presidential 
succession, they have never been tested and the overarching power of the 
incumbent allows ample scope for manipulation of the process. 
Secondly, removing the dominating influence of President Suharto 
J will expose the role of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) in society 
L and reignite debate both within the ABRI and among the public about 
ABRI' s political role and how it is to be exercised. Suharto, especially in 
recent years, has effectively, but perhaps temporarily, neutered ABRI as a 
political actor and has bent it to his own needs as the backbone of the 
regime. The question to be answered is: will ABRI reemerge as a 
powerful national political force in its own right, will it form part of an 
elite coalition, or will it withdraw from politics altogether? Of more 
immediate interest, does it have sufficient residual political integrity to 
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play a role in the succession by, for example, convincing Suharto that it 
is time for him to hand the baton to another. 
Thirdly, the succession will not be a simple matter of changing the 
leader of a viable regime as might have occurred had Suharto stepped 
down in the 1980s. His succession will open up broader questions 
relating to political structures and norms appropriate to the Indonesia in 
the twenty-first century and the global environment in which it must 
coexist and compete. 
The immediate question for the Indonesian elite is whether they are 
going to allow Suharto to dictate the timing of his succession and to 
choose his successor. The events of 1996 seemed to signal the beginning 
of the end of his reign. The year was marked by questionable economic 
decisions which favoured his family and ran counter to the general trend 
of economic policy; a major scandal in the Supreme Court exposing 
collusive practices and discrediting the judiciary more generally; and his 
political ineptitude in manipulating the internal affairs of the Indonesian 
Democratic Party (PDI) and coping with its aftermath. There were also 
several sporadic social disturbances in the lead-up to the May 1997 
parliamentary elections which indicated growing social frustration with 
some aspects of development and the absence of genuine political outlets 
for these frustrations. 
If significant elements of the elite conclude that Suharto's time is up, 
how can they organize succession? Many members of the elite have long 
thought that succession is overdue but they have not acted because of 
Suharto's overriding powers of patronage and coercion. Even when it is 
obvious that his time is nigh he is still a dangerous man to cross. 
Consequently, those who would like to see him go have three broad 
options. First, they could adopt a direct approach by mustering sufficient ' 
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support from the elite to make it plain that the presidential elections of ) 
March 1998 should be contested and that the outcome could be 
uncertain, or at least sufficiently contested to puncture his proprietal 
image. Secondly, they could adopt an indirect approach. This might take 
the form of heaping praise on Suharto's achievements and encouraging 
him to retire with dignity or of encouraging a national campaign in 
support of renewal which conveyed the same message in a different 
5 
form. Thirdly, they could combine both approaches or take advantage of 
societal mobilization by other political forces to achieve the same effect. 
Another form of direct approach would be a military coup d'etat . 
Indonesia has experienced several coup attempts but, with the exception 
of the disguised coup which unseated Sukarno, they have not been 
successful. Moreover, the direct control Suharto exercises over senior 
appointments, the ~}9city of_ change in senior appointments, the 
pervasiveness of the intelligence system, and the fragmentation of 
command arrangements makes it unlikely that anyone except the 
minister for defence, the commander-in-chief, or the army chief of staff 
could mobilize sufficient support to mount a coup. However, unless at 
least two of them acted in unison such action could lead to civil war. 
Collusion between any two would be difficult because of their different 
allegiances and interests. Moreover, unless they were prepared to hold 
their ground and had the support of troop commanders, Suharto could 
easily replace them with more pliable officers. 
Coups do not always arise from rational political processes but can 
also arise spontaneously. For example, should there be widespread unrest 
as a result of economic disparities, perceived injustices of some kind, or 
during an election campaign, it is possible that troops deployed to quell 
the unrest might revolt and even side with the protesters. Even if such 
spontaneous revolts or coup attempts by lower level commanders or their 
troops were defeated they might still be a catalyst for change. Although 
the possibility of a coup seems remote, once it is felt that Suharto' s reign 
is in decline the possibilities will almost certainly increase. 
Such possibilities will increase the incentive for ABRI to exercise 
some influence over the succession. If Suharto is left to linger on at the 
head of a drifting and outmoded regime the danger of political violence 
and a breakdown in military cohesion will become a growing threat to 
ABRI' s corporate interests. It would, therefore, seem to be in ABRI' s 
interest to have Suharto step aside at the March 1998 presidential 
elections or soon thereafter and provide a firm base for succession and 
regime transition. Whether ABRI has the capacity to exercise this degree 
of influence and control remains to be seen. 
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Undoubtedly, ABRI has contingency plans to maintain order during 
the succession. It may also have a very general political contingency 
plan. However, given Suharto's dominance, it is unlikely to have a 
detailed political game plan designed to impose a successor or a plan for 
subsequent reforms. Consequently, its internal cohesion remains 
dependent to a considerable degree on the outcome of elite competition 
(including competition among factions in the officer corps) for the 
presidency and the spoils of office. 
Following his normal practice, Suharto has kept his own counsel and 
given no indication of his intentions. It is generally believed that he 
intends to stand for a seventh five-year term in 1998 unless unexpectedly 
strong opposition arises from within the elite. Bearing in mind Sukarno's 
shabby treatment by the New Order, the fate of South Korea's recent 
rulers, the number of skeletons in Suharto's cupboard, and his imperative 
to vouchsafe the interests of his family, he is unlikely to step down 
voluntarily. And when he does depart (assuming it is not by death or 
gross incapacity), he will seek a decisive role in selecting his successor. 
The matter of who will replace Suharto when the time comes will be 
subject to intense political jockeying among elite factions. Any successor 
is likely to come from within Golkar or the army. Neither the populist 
PDI nor the conservative United Development Party (PPP), are likely to 
have credible presidential contenders, even as compromise candidates, 
because of the number of appointed members in the legislatures, controls 
on mass mobilization, and lack of support from within the army. 
Although the choice of successor will influence the character of the 
government and the direction and speed of change, whoever is selected is 
likely to be forced along the path of transition by the mounting tide of 
social and economic change that has swept Indonesia since 1965. 
Transition 
Suharto's successor is unlikely to command the personal political 
authority Suharto has gathered unto himself. His successor will be faced 
with the daunting tasks of gathering the reins of power and implementing 
society-wide reforms. The challenge will be to build on the progress 
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achieved so far while at the same time broadening political space, 
reforming the instruments of state, and opening the economy to a wider 
range of domestic and external forces. 
Whether authoritarian and liberal democratic regimes are opposite 
ends of a continuum or whether they are two independent and unrelated 
states, they are separated by a process of change. Huntington (1991 :11-
12,305) talces a dichotomous approach but allows the notion of semi-
democracy. In a recent article Huntington (1995) gives further 
recognition to degrees of democracy but does not recognize them as 
enduring alternatives. Case (1992) used the concept of semi-democracy 
to describe the political system of Malaysia. In Malaysia the journey 
towards liberal democracy, according to Case, has become bogged-down 
temporarily by irreconcilable racial cleavages and the coincidence of 
elite interests. This is consistent with Huntington's (1991 :25) observation 
that progress towards liberal democracy is not necessarily a straight line 
but might, at different periods, involve withdrawals, marking time and 
sideways movement as well as progress. Consequently, it is important to 
identify the obstacles Indonesia will confront because they will influence 
the direction and rate of progress. 
Huntington (1991) analyzed what he termed 'the third wave of 
democratization' by searching for the causes and processes involved. 
The first wave of democratization occurred between the end of the 
nineteenth century and the end of World War One with the break-up of 
the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. The second wave rose after 
World War Two and the third wave began in 1974 and ended in 1990 
when his book was written. The first two waves suffered reverses, the first 
caused mainly by the rise of fascism, and the second as a result of post-
colonial tensions and ideological conflict. Although the third wave has 
lost momentum, there is no sign of it being reversed on the same scale as 
its predecessors, despite the evident tensions in South Africa, the states of 
the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
Huntington (1991:33) attributed third wave democratization to 
changes in global power, rising levels of economic development, 
snowballing [following the example of others], and its being seen as a 
cure for a range of maladies ranging from inflation and economic 
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recession to military defeat and the breakdown of law and order. He 
defined the three processes by which democratization occurred as 
transition, replacement and transplacement. Transition is the process by .J 
which elites bring about democratization; replacement occurs when 
opposition groups take or seize power and effect change; and 
transplacement occurs when there is a relative balance of power between 
government and opposition and they negotiate to effect change. 
Why Transition? 
Transition occurred in 16 of the 35 countries in Huntington's third wave 
and by transplacement in 11. Transition is the most likely course for 
Indonesia because: 
• the New Order elite remains relatively strong and united; 
• the opposition is relatively weak and fragmented; 
• the most influential supporters of change come from liberalizers 
within the regime rather than democrats; 
• there is no economic crisis on the horizon; 
• there is a general recognition that political reform is long 
overdue; 
• the elite has a strong interest in keeping control of the process, 
combined with an underlying fear of the mobilizing power of 
politicized Islam; 
• the military shares power, is relatively united, and is a major 
faction, if not the dominant component, of the elite, and 
• there is fear of upheaval in a society that has experienced a lot of 
upheaval in the past. 
Liberalize or democratize? 
Huntington (1991:36) concluded that democracy comes when elites want 
it. Determining why elites want change is not easy but generally relates to 
9 
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external developments and changes within society which force the elite to 
compromise to preserve its advantage. Where does the Indonesian elite 
stand on the need for change? No attempt is made here to define the elite 
other than to say that it comprises that group of civilian and military 
leaders who take an active part in shaping and promoting their visions of 
Indonesia's political future, including senior members of government 
and the bureaucracy, some members of the legislature, some members of 
political parties and associated organizations, some business leaders, 
senior ABRI officers, some retired officers and their associations, and 
some research institutions (such as the National Sciences Institute (LIPI)). 
Comprehensive research on the composition, structure and opinion of the 
elite has not been allowed and any assessment of the strength and vitality 
of the structures of power is obscured by Suharto's overweening 
influence on them. Some tentative observations, however, can be made. 
It is possible to classify and analyse the officer corps according to 
several criteria including: race, ethnicity, religion, social class, military 
class, generation, service, corps, patronage groups, and ideology. 
However, the inability to conduct comprehensive research prevents 
detailed analysis of the officer corps. A generalized description of the 
officer corps would probably show that: its origins are predominantly 
middle class; it is mostly nominal/secular Muslim with strong Christian 
minority representation; it is representative of ethnic diversity but mostly 
Javanese, because of differences in population size and historical 
advantage. 
Racial and ethnic differences exist, as in any mixed social group, but 
they do not represent significant cleavages in the officer corps. 
Nevertheless, there are fluid informal networks, mainly concerned with 
personal advantage, based on these divides. Military classes produce 
some continuing bonds but they are attenuated by dispersion after 
graduation, the mixing of classes in postgraduate training, and cross 
class/generation patronage networks. With the ascent of the Military 
Academy graduates to the most senior command positions in ABRI after 
1988, the generation gap between the 1945 and bridging generations has 
disappeared within the active officer corps. 
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During the Old Order the army was largely immune to religious 
tensions because it had been purged of Muslim fundamentalists. 
Tensions between the nominal Muslim majority and the Christian 
minority began to build in the early New Order period as Suharto used 
Christian officers in politically sensitive posts. Christian officers, like 
Panggabean, Sudomo and Murdani did not represent a political threat to 
Suharto and were dependent on his patronage. However, this apparent 
favouritism of Christians, together with the perceived anti-Islamic 
approach of early New Order governments, led to a backlash which 
Suharto, in later years, was able to exploit to balance the power of the 
army and muster support for Golkar and his continuation in power. 
The decline in the fortunes of Christian officers has had little effect 
on the active officer corps because of the minority status of Christian 
officers and their reliance on continued patronage from their Muslim 
seniors. However, it has caused disquiet which is reflected in the retired 
officer corps, both Muslim and Christian. They fear that the conscious 
promotion of Islam and the preference given to the promotion of 
Muslim officers could exacerbate the social and religious tensions they 
have been trying to suppress since 1945. They also fear that the 
promotion of such tensions undermines the ideological legitimacy of the 
New Order. 
The main means of promoting personal and group interests remains 
hierarchically structured patronage groups. The composition of these 
groups changes as officers are moved around, promoted and retired or 
fall from grace. The patron derives his power from his ability to 
influence promotion, postings, overseas schooling, and financial support 
for his clients. Once the power of patronage is lost the client must 
quickly find another patron if he is to continue to prosper. While these 
relationships are by definition fickle they have great force while they last, 
as evidenced by the apparent threat the networks established by Generals 
Murdani and Wismoyo posed to President Suharto. The attitude of the 
patrons of the day to political transition will be crucial in the immediate 
post-Suharto era. 
Organizational expression of corporate interests comes mainly from 
the commander-in-chief, the army chief of staff, and the chief of social-
11 
political staff at ABRI headquarters. Their current pronouncements 
reflect the doctrinal line of the regime as approved by Suharto but they 
are forced to analyse and reflect on the global and domestic changes 
occurring around them in order to protect the regime. There is a great 
deal of frustration that many of the forces driving change - for example 
'the market' and the internet - have little structural form, which makes 
it difficult to isolate the nation and the ideological construct of the New 
Order. Consequently, once the imperative of protecting the person of 
Suharto from political challenge ceases to be the prime function of 
ABRI, its attention will shift to the reforms necessary to preserve the New 
Order and to maintaining internal cohesion. 
ABRI was the creator of the New Order and has been one of its 
major beneficiaries and its custodian. Personal and corporate interest will 
ensure that it tries to preserve its place in the post-Suharto era. But it will 
be subject to the currents of change affecting the middle class and the 
elite, of which it is part. As the new president is unlikely to have the 
monopoly on policy that Suharto has exercised, the question of the 
structure and boundaries of the New Order will come into sharper focus. 
Within ABRI there will be differences of opinion on these questions but 
they will be differences of degree between what Huntington (1991:9,121) 
has classified as 'liberalizers' rather than between liberalizers and 
democrats. These differences will be played out between contenders for 
power and their patronage networks. 
ABRI will probably be unable to address such questions in isolation 
and will be forced to involve elements of the civilian middle class and 
elite. The civilian elite is much more diverse and fragmented. The major 
holders of capital are the Chinese minority who generally support the 
status quo. They have been the major beneficiaries of economic 
liberalization but are still constrained by the socialist streak still evident in 
political circles, from the president down, and a bureaucracy which acts 
as the guardian and beneficiary of the control it exercises over the 
economy (Schwarz 1994:81). Chinese business would be wary of any 
political reforms which threatened to unleash pent-up antipathy to the 
Chinese community. While they would accept that change is inevitable 
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they would probably prefer reform of the current regime to a hasty 
process of democratization. 
The bureaucrats would be wary of reforms which undermined their 
political influence and access to economic rents. The encouragement of 
indigenous business is a double edged sword from this perspective. On 
the one hand it ameliorates antipathy toward the Chinese but on the other 
hand it creates a larger and more influential indigenous middle class. 
Many of the current indigenous capital holders have family or patronage 
relationships with the bureaucracy which provide access to government 
contracts and protection from Chinese and foreign business. 
Plans to privatize government enterprises have been moving very 
slowly .3 Many are unprofitable and rely on state subsidies and 
protection. Privatization would mean the loss of jobs at all levels and 
diminution of bureaucratic control of the economy. Privatization is also 
linked to debates about state protection of high technology industry 
which will, it is claimed, allow Indonesia to take technological leaps into 
the future rather than follow the step-by-step approach of conventional 
liberal economic theory. 
Indigenous capitalists, however, are not a united group. Those not 
well connected to the bureaucrats would be keen to see the power of the 
bureaucracy curbed and government contracts more open to 
competition. They would also like to see more competition in partnering 
foreign investment projects. Nevertheless, they would be wary of political 
reforms which advantaged big capital. All these groups share a desire to 
see the maintenance of a strong state, if for different reasons. None of 
them would benefit from rapid democratization which could undermine 
their economic advantage. At best they would be reluctant liberalizers. 
There is not a high degree of overlap between private enterprise and 
political parties. The government party, Golkar, is dominated by ABRI 
and the bureaucracy (including state enterprise interests). But private 
enterprise interests are represented through functional groups, like the 
chambers of commerce, and linkages with ABRI and the bureaucracy. 
Although Chinese capital dominates the economy, the pariah status of the 
Chinese mean that they cannot take a prominent position in politics, 
although their financial support is important to Golkar. The other two 
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parties do not enjoy business support on anywhere near the same scale. 
Golkar provides Suharto with electoral legitimacy but once he departs 
office internal tensions are likely to deepen existing cleavages. There are 
few democrats among Golkar members but there appears to be some 
support for liberalization of the political structure. Most, however, are 
likely to want Golkar to remain the party of government. 
Of the other parties, the POI (Indonesian Democratic Party) and 
those mass organizations sympathetic to its populist politics range from 
strong advocates of liberalization to democrats. While this group is 
relatively weak it has potential to grow and will at least push the 
liberalizers along the road of reform. The PPP (United Development 
Party) is more problematic. Despite efforts to take religion out of politics, 
the PPP is generally supported by a core of conservative Muslims and 
radical Muslim reformers. Some of its members still hanker for an 
Islamic state and would support reform which allowed the party to 
prosper, but it would not necessarily support democratization, except as 
an expedient. 
Although liberalization might benefit POI and PPP it would also 
unleash internal cleavages dating back to the forced amalgamation of the 
parties in 1973. Current party officials, many of whom owe their 
positions to government patronage, would also be potential losers; but 
they would find it difficult to resist internal demands once government 
manipulation of party leadership was loosened. 
With the demise of communism as a credible alternative, and given 
the syncretic and fragmented nature of Indonesian Islam, the only 
credible threat to liberalizers and democrats alike would be a military 
coup d'etat in support of the status quo. Although this cannot be ruled 
out, it would be against the general world trend and would probably not 
endure for long. However, given the political and military power of 
ABRI, most candidates are likely to seek the military' s acquiescence, if 
not its active support. 
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Forces for change 
What is propelling this desire for reform and why is there little support 
for democracy among the elite and middle classes? The factors 
propelling change range from global olitical change occasioned by the 
end of the Cold War and globalization of the economy to domestic and 
social change and Suharto's failure to accommodate them. With the end 
of the Cold War the US no longer has to court Indonesia's support and 
can give greater vent to the promotion of human rights and democracy. 
There has also been the demonstration effect of the apparent victory of 
democracy over authoritarianism, with books like Fukuyama' s (1992) 
postulating that the end of history is liberal democracy. Whether true or 
not it has given heart to democratizers and spurred standpatters 
(Huntington's term for supporters of the status quo) and liberalizers into 
action to stem the democratic tide. Closer to home, democracy has been 
reestablished in the Philippines and is maturing in Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan and there are indications of increasing liberalization in the 
semi-democracies of Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. 
Globalization of the economy has not only expanded market 
opportunities but has illtensified-1he.s.Qmetition for capital and markets. 
This has the effect of squeezing out inefficiencies in the economy, 
including protection, patronage and corruption which are important tools 
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of authoritarian cQntr.oL.of the middle class. President Suharto has 
adapted grudgingly with ever more liberal economic reform packages. 
These have made his ~eversals, usually in support of his family's business 
interests, seem even more aberrant, highlighting the need for a change of 
leadership and political reforms. 
~mestically, there has been rapid economic growth, diversification 
from reliance on primary production to manufacturing and service 
industries, accompanied by increasing urbanization and a growing 
middle class. Urbanization has mostly affected Jakarta and to a lesser 
extent Surabaya, Medan and Bandung. Urbanization of the capital, as de 
Tocqueville (1856/1955:75) observed in the case of Paris prior to the 
French Revolution, can prove a potent and unstable combination of 
middle class intellectual stimulus and working class manpower. As yet 
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there is n-o indication that this potential is being harnessed but it is a 
contingency reflected in the concentration of ABRI units around the 
capital and plans to increase ABRI's manpower (Lowry 1996). 
Huntington (1991 :311) observed that democratization rarely 
succeeds in countries with very low per capita GDP and that '[p]overty is 
a principal and probably the principal obstacle to democratic 
development'. As a result of successful economic policy, Indonesia's per 
capita GDP is about $US 1300 putting it at the bottom of the window 
within which successful transitions are possible (ibid.:272) and on a par 
with the Philippines. 
Economic growth has been accompanied by an exponential growth 
of the middle class. The result has been the creation of a middle class 
overhang beyond the demand of employers and beyond the resources of 
government to coopt. This middle class overhang is fertile ground for 
groups seeking greater political openness and accountability, Jaw reform, 
and genuine competition for business opportunities. 
As foreign capital is increasingly called on to play a greater role in 
economic development the pressure for transparent government 
processes and practices, and reform of the legal system makes the ill-
disguised nepotism of Suharto seem ever more anachronistic. However, 
law reform and reduction of the bureaucracy cannot be effected without 
tearing away the pillars of authoritarian rule. 
Most of the elite and middle class have little sympathy for liberal 
democracy. They accept the dogma of the Old and New Orders that 
liberal democracy was the cause of Indonesia's problems during the 
Revolution and in the 1950s. While this view is genuinely held by some 
people, tjie_prime rationale for denigrating democracy is to prevent its re-
emergence as an alternative regime. Opponents of democracy point to 
the geographic and ethnic fragmentation of the nation, economic 
inequalities (including Chinese dominance of the economy), its 
uneducated and ignorant masses (Massa Bodoh) who are incapable of 
making informed political choices, the undeveloped economy, and the 
need to improve the people's welfare before addressing lower order 
needs like democracy. Needless to say, there is also the fear of demands 
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from the Massa Bodoh for greater equalization of national wealth and 
services. 
Consequently, while vociferous student groups, non-government 
groups and the populist supporters of the PDI who advocate liberal 
democracy are often heard, they are still in a minority. Although they 
add to the impetus for change, none of Huntington's third wave 
democratizations occurred solely as a result of student action. General 
public support was essential and was almost always expressed in mass 
public rallies (Huntington 1991 :204 ). To date, Indonesian political 
activists have been unable to draw broad middle class support for such 
rallies. 
The National Sciences Institute has undertaken a study of 
Indonesia's political system. The study accepts that some sort of liberal 
democracy is inevitable. Consequently, it proposes a phased transition 
over twenty years, commencing with minor procedural and structural 
reforms and ending with substantive reforms which would see the 
emergence of liberal democracy prior to the APEC target for open Asia-
Pacific markets in 2020. Suharto has rejected this deliberate, almost 
apolitical, approach to democratization but the debate is indicative of 
elite perceptions of the need for change and the challenges confronted. 
Challenges 
Although the forces of change are present and will be responded to in 
various ways when Suharto departs office, there is a number of 
challenges confronting both liberalizers and democratizers. These 
include the relationship between government, party, and regime; the role 
of parties-ape! limitations on- voter mobilization; the role and command 
arrangements of ABRI; and the chall ge of regionalism and re_!igion. 
As Lawson (1991:21) has pointed out, the distinction between 
government, party and regime is usually deliberately blurred in 
authoritarian regimes. Suharto made this point clear in 1980 when he 
quashed an attempt by the commander-in-chief to distance ABRI from 
direct support for Golkar in the 1982 elections. His view was that only 
Golkar represented the true interests of the New Order and that ABRI, as 
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creator of the New Order, had no choice but to support it. Implicit in this 
view was that Suharto, as the leader of Golkar, was the embodiment of the 
New Order and that all else, including the other parties and ABRI, were 
obliged to support him (Jenkins 1984:157). This view is consist with 
Lawson's (1991: 17) description of the organic state. 
To avoid this situation being perpetuated, the liberalizers have 
advocated that in future the presidents be limited to one or two terms. 
This would entrench periodic replacement and open up competition for 
the top job within Golkar on a regular basis thus drawing a clear 
distinction between the party leader and the party. But what of the 
relationship between Golkar and government or the executive head of 
government and the legislature? The legislature cannot exercise its 
oversight of executive government if the dominant party is a mere cipher 
of its leader. Limiting the term of presidents might help this process by 
ensuring that no future leader becomes the proprietor of the party with 
the overwhelming powers of patronage and punishment wielded by 
Suharto. 
Implementing law reforms to ensure independence of the judiciary 
and permitting judicial review of legislation and executive fiats would 
also encourage legislators to exercise their responsibilities without undue 
fear of reprisal. The presence of other political parties in the legislature, 
allowed to compete on equal terms at elections, would encourage the 
legislature to perform its role as a balance to executive power. 
Golkar has effectively been the government party, or the electoral 
vehicle for the New Order. However, in 1985 all parties were forced to 
expunge promotion of alternative ideologies or regimes from their party 
constitutions and enshrine adherence to Pancasila democracy as the 
basis of the party program. In theory, all three authorized parties should 
then have been eligible to compete on an equal footing at the five-yearly 
elections. In practice the government has refused to allow this reform to 
take effect and has continued to treat the other two parties as 
pendamping (accompanists), not alternative lead players. The question 
for the liberalizers is should this practice continue or should the other 
parties be allowed to compete on an equal basis according to the 
doctrine, as opposed to the practice, of the New Order? 
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The former course means the continued enforcement of what is in 
effect a one-party state. The latter potentially opens up the road to liberal 
democracy. The main contest will be between the standpatters seeking to 
perpetuate the status quo and liberalizers trying to rejuvenate the regime. 
To the extent that the current New Order is in fact the Suharto Order, the 
standpatters have the ground cut from under them. The perpetuation of 
the status quo is impossible unless they can find another figure who can 
take over where Suharto leaves off. As that is unlikely, the liberalizers 
would seem to have some freedom of movement. 
Accepting that standpatters and liberalizers have the upper hand, 
what changes can the latter make without undermining the foundations 
of the regime? Current control mechanisms include: 
• mono-loyalty for the bureaucracy, according to which they are 
expected to support, campaign and vote for Golkar if they know 
what is good for their careers; 
• prohibition on members of the military from joining, supporting 
or voting for political parties in return for a proportion of seats 
in national and regional legislatures; 
• implicit and constant campaigning on behalf of Golkar by the 
bureaucracy and ABRI; 
• prohibition of party mobilization below district level (the so-
called 'floating mass' concept); 
• prohibition of electioneering outside declared election campaign 
periods; 
• manipulation of political party and mass organization leadership 
elections; 
• government vetting (BAKORSTANAS) of party electoral lists; 
• the appointment of one third of the members of the senior 
legislative body (MPR); 
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• executive supremacy and the absence of any functioning 
separation of powers between the executive, legislature and 
judiciary. 
Obviously, compared with a definition of democracy which provides 
for political parties campaigning freely on an equal basis, a broad non-
discriminating franchise, people voting without fear according to their 
own judgements, and the majority party or coalition of parties forming a 
government and exercising control of state power (Lawson 1991 ), 
Pancasila democracy has some shortcomings. 
From a standpatter or liberalizer's perspective, which of the control 
mechanisms listed above could be discarded without endangering the 
dominance of Golkar? The first two controls are critical to Golkar' s 
continual dominance. ABRI' s seats provide a firm base for the regime 
but without the mono-loyalty provisions to lock in the bureaucracy there 
would be a drift to the other parties; in combination they could 
conceivably, over time, garner sufficient support to outvote ABRI and 
Golkar in the election of a president. 
In theory that would not be inconsistent with doctrine and should 
not be of concern because the law on referenda effectively rules out 
constitutional changes not agreed by all parties and factions . However, 
the loss of the powers of patronage available to the presidency would 
mean the loss of many jobs held by Golkar supporters or switches in 
their allegiance and would almost certainly further undermine Golkar's 
prospects of electoral recovery. 
The critical factor in this conunqrum is ABRI, which created Golkar 
in 1964. Golkar consists of three streams: ABRI, the bureaucracy and 
functional groups (representatives of walks of life, professions and the 
business community). Active ABRI members are prohibited from 
participating in Golkar except for nominated senior officers who hold ex 
officio appointments on Golkar' s national and regional councils. ABRI is 
primarily represented in Golkar by its retiree organizations. These 
organizations interact with the active military through social-political 
councils which coordinate their stance. 
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The question therefore is: would the active ABRI be prepared to step 
away from Golkar and allow the three authorized political p~rties to 
compete equally? Would it feel that its quota of parliamentary seats and 
the restrictive legislation on referenda allowed it sufficient control to 
stand aloof from the electoral process and accept the peoples' verdict? 
This question will not be addressed until Suharto is unseated, but if 
General (Retired) Rudini (1994) is any guide, at least some members of 
ABRI would be prepared to take that route. 
This then raises the question of ABRI' s relationship to the executive 
and the legislature. According to current dogma ABRI is subject to the 
executive head of state in his role as supreme commander for defence 
against an external foe. However, in domestic politics ABRI's first loyalty 
is to the Pancasila state; it is supposedly above day-to-day politics. In 
reality it has been subordinated to President Suharto and has not been 
able to exercise any discretionary judgement since at least the late 1970s, 
although efforts were made a various times by Generals Yusuf and 
Murdani to uphold the integrity of ABRI. 
Will ABRI allow the next president the same degree of control? If 
not, how will it limit executive control? How will it limit control of 
personnel matters currently exercised by the president? How will it 
decide its attitude to issues of liberalization or democratization and how 
will it resolve differences if its attitudes are incongruent with those of the 
new president? Who will select ABRI's legislative representatives? Who 
will instruct them on policy positions? Will ABRI still have the task of 
screening candidates for political office? 
All that can be said now is that ABRI itself will come under greater 
pressure and will need to figure out how to separate its monopoly of the 
means and application of coercion from its political role. It is debatable 
whether ABRI can establish an apolitical ethos within the forces while at 
another level being actively involved in politics. More importantly,· will 
the public see it as an impartial force? If not, the rationale of its doctrinal 
position of standing above the fray of day-to-day politics will be 
undermined. 
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Obstacles 
What obstacles, then, are likely to influence the attitudes of ABRI to 
liberalization and democratization? ABRI is an enduring institution and a 
political actor which shares with Suharto an ingrained disposition to 
retain the reins of power both for its own benefit and from a belief that 
only authoritarian rule can hold the nation together. How the problem of 
'Unity and Solidarity' are addressed by the different interests involved 
will determine the scope and pace of change and whether Indonesia will 
be detained at some semi-democratic staging post, like Malaysia and 
Singapore. This conundrum has to be addressed whether it is a genuine 
concern or one that has been cynically perpetuated to justify continued 
authoritarian rule. 
Concern for unity and solidarity stems from a number of factors , the 
main ones being regional disparities and ethnic and religious diversity. It 
is still conceivable that regionally based parties could emerge, demanding 
independence, autonomy, or greater return of economic rents (see Booth 
1992). This spacial reality is compounded by ethnic differences and the 
archipelagic nature of the country. The state has struggled to overcome 
this centrifugal tendency by several means, including: forcing imports 
and exports to be channelled through Java; centralizing the 
administration; indoctrination; concentrating economic development -
especially process industries (by commission or omission) - in Java to 
balance the resource wealth of some areas of the seberang (other 
islands); limited economic development in the seberang; and making 
local government dependent on central government financial subventions 
and services. All these measures have worked to some degree to inculcate 
Indonesian nationalism but they have not necessarily subordinated all 
ethnic and regional loyalties. Moreover, some of these measures are no 
longer economically rational and have been phased out. 
Ethnic tensions are now of a different order to those which prevailed 
in the early years of the Republic. The emergence of ethnic 
independence movements on Java is no longer conceivable and ethnic 
loyalties in many other areas have been subsumed within an Indonesian 
identity. There is little doubt that some regions would seek independence 
if a liberal democratic regime were adopted, particularly East Timor and 
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Irian Jaya. There is equally little doubt that other areas would demand 
greater decentralization of political power and economic development. 
However, these centrifugal tendencies should not be overrated. Most 
ethnic tensions could be overcome by political compromise. 
In economic terms, Hal Hill has argued, Indonesia has been 
comparatively successful in managing 'sub-national diversity' (Hill 
1996), but large variations in regional economies remain. However, Hill's 
definition of region is based on provincial government boundaries which 
bear little relationship to ethnic boundaries or potentially viable 
independent states. On an island by island basis, according to Hill's 
figures, only Sumatra, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya have gross regional 
products above the average on a per capita basis. Of these only Irian Jaya 
has any potential to form a united island-wide party which might seek 
independence; such a move in the other islands would probably be 
defeated by ethnic and regional diversity. How demands for regional 
autonomy would be expressed and accommodated is a matter for 
politicians but they would have to be prepared to address these issues if 
they were to become agents of transition. 
Adding to the inertia towards reform is the question of religion. By 
definition, in a liberal democracy there can be no bar on political parties 
using religion to mobilize support for their cause although limits can 
legitimately be placed on the means used to gamer that support. 
Nevertheless, allowing the reemergence of religion as a basis for political 
mobilization might · have two effects. It might exacerbate centrifugal 
tendencies in the eastern reaches of the state, and it could lead to 
demands which are antithetical to liberal democracy, such as restrictions 
on freedom of religion and freedom of political competition, and 
demands for the application of religious law - a sort of 'Algerian 
dilemma' where transition might open the possibility of a theist state 
rather than a liberal democracy. 
The danger of a theist state emerging in Indonesia is probably 
overstated, given: 
• the fragmentation and schisms of all religions; 
• the syncretic nature of Indonesian Islam in important regions; 
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the attraction of the freedom inherent in liberal democracy 
amongst the young; 
the inherent demands for political and legal certainty in an open 
economy (although not necessarily inconsistent with Islam, there 
are no examples to prove the point), and 
the fact that international examples of Islamic states, like Iran, 
have not provided an attractive model. 
Moreover, much of the New Order structure and norms have been 
deliberately constructed to contain and dilute the latent challenge of 
Islam. The New Order has adopted a position defined as secular but God-
fearing. There is no nominated state religion, but having a religion is 
mandatory; the use of religion for political mobilization has been 
banned. These measures were designed to counter communism, to 
convince the Muslim community of the regime's religious credentials, to 
deny political space for religious extremism, and as a means of 
inculcating conformity. 
Some micro studies of Islamic opinion tend to suggest that banning 
the use of religion for political mobilization in 1985 has changed the 
voting behaviour of Muslims (for example Turmudi in Sofyan 1995 :21-
41 ). Now that there is no overt Muslim party, Muslim leaders have been 
coaxed in greater numbers to shift their allegiance from the PPP (prior to 
1985 the Islamic party) to the government party, Golkar. Another effect 
of this strategy has been to diminish the political influence of Muslim 
leaders. When Islamic leaders are seen to promote different parties it is 
difficult for them to claim divine guidance for their choice of party 
without evoking some puzzlement from their followers. Such measures 
have added to the domestication and fragmentation of political Islam 
under the New Order. 
However, the absence of an overt Muslim political party does not 
mean that Islam has been tamed forever as a political force. Some 
members of the elite share Bloom's (1995:228) rather alarmist view that 
Islam is a 'meme [ideology] grown ravenous' intent on imposing its 
domain on all nations and disposing of competing ideologies. Therefore, 
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if containing the ideological challenge of Islam and retaining the current 
boundaries of the state are to remain political imperatives, other means of 
containing the challenge will have to be found that are compatible with 
more pluralistic state structures and norms if the fear of Muslim 
fundamentalism is not to become an obstacle to democratization. 
A related aspect of liberal democracy which worries the military is 
the fear that democratic mobilization will get out of control and that they 
will not be able to maintain social order in a more dynamic and fluid 
society. They also worry that democratically elected governments will not 
be able to provide the long-term stability provided by the present regime. 
Such concerns may be dismissed as rationalizations but they draw on the 
perceived failures of constitutional democracy in the 1950s and a lack of 
understanding that liberal democracy is not without limits. 
The regime's simplistic critique of liberal democracy suggests that 
there are no constraints on individual or sectoral interests and obscures 
the fact that liberal democracies depend on a general commitment to 
uphold the rules of democratic behaviour as laid down in the constitution 
and enabling legislation. There is little recognition that in a democracy 
there must be a commitment to peaceful means of mobilization and 
change, a willingness to surrender government, tolerance of opposition, 
and recognition of the conditional use of state power (Lawson 1991:13). 
In a liberal democratic state, freedom to profess or not to profess 
religion is a fundamental right, even though the state may hold a 
particular religion in first place. But again this does not mean that there 
are no limits. Many liberal democracies have enacted laws to minimize 
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion and the like in the 
interests of equality and community harmony. These are fundamental 
considerations for regime transition which were left in abeyance in 
March 1957 in the constitutional debate which preceded the declaration 
of martial law and the imposition of Guided Democracy in July 1959. 
The Liberalizers' Agenda 
The liberalizers are likely to be at the forefront of reform in Indonesia 
because the democrats have not been able to mobilize broad-based and 
sustained support from the middle classes. Nevertheless, the democrats 
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provide some of the motivation necessary to propel reform. There have 
been seminars and discussions on the post-Suharto era but a 
comprehensive agenda for reform has not been put forward because of 
regime pressures and divisions of opinion on the subject. However, 
General Rudini, Chief of Army Staff 1983-86, Minister for Home Affairs 
1988-93, and currently head of the Indonesian Institute for Strategic 
Studies (LPSI) has provided the outline of a liberalizer's agenda. This 
agenda is both a critique of the New Order and a thinly disguised 
political manifesto for a presidential aspirant. 
Rudini's view is that if the system is not fulfilling the aspirations of 
the people or supporting development then, to avoid political turmoil, 
perhaps modification is more appropriate than changing the system 
(Rudini 1994:13). He claims that the structure and laws are in place but 
that their application is too restrictive (ibid.:18,36) and that future 
presidents must strive for democratic, clean and respected government 
(ibid.:15,19). He describes the faults of the system as the recent 
emergence of exclusivism, primodialism and neo-feudalism (ibid.: 19) 
and suggests that the regime needs to be more open to criticism 
(ibid.:61). Although the editors (Sunaryo, Nasihin Masha and Perry 
Umar Farouk) of Rudini's book comment that his answers to 
Indonesia's problems are too general and cliched (ibid.:vii) it is worth 
listing his proposals and silences. Rudini proposes that: 
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• it is time to review and reform the institutions of state, including 
the legislatures (MPR [People's Consultative Assembly], DPR 
[National Parliament] and DPRD [regional parliaments]), the 
presidency, the judiciary, the Supreme Advisory Council (DPA), 
the Financial Audit Agency (BPK) and provincial government 
(ibid.:12); 
• it is time for Golkar and the other authorized parties to stand on 
their own feet without guidance or influence from external 
forces (ibid.:50); 
• dwi fangsi ABRI should stay but be adapted to social, scientific 
and technological advances (ibid.:72); 
• Indonesia needs to retain a strong executive to cope with its size 
and heterogeneity (ibid.: 16); 
• the five laws passed in 1985 to govern political parties, mass 
organizations, elections, referenda, etc. should be reviewed 
(ibid.: 175), including a proposal to extend party representation 
to village level (ibid.:43); 
• the MPR should meet more regularly as a means of curbing 
presidential prerogative and of keeping the incumbent in touch 
with popular opinion (ibid.:16); and 
• the system should be capable of changing its leadership 
according to the wishes of the majority (ibid.:55). 
Rudini predicts that if these things are done the regime will survive. 
In keeping with his liberalizer approach, Rudini acknowledges the role of 
a free but 'responsible' press in promoting and vouchsafing openness 
(ibid.:85), as well as freedom and openness for the arts 'in the service of 
building society' (ibid.: 153). He still sees politics as a top down activity 
and is ambivalent about abolishing the 'floating mass' concept which 
prevents parties from establishing grassroots support bases (ibid.:24-
28,49) while at the same time acknowledging that this structure 
advantages Golkar (ibid.:42). 
He also supports retention of a unitary state, citing the break-up of 
federal states such as the USSR and Yugoslavia as evidence of the failure 
of federal structures (ibid.:11). Rudini makes no mention of limiting the 
number of terms of the president but does recommend that provincial 
heads of government be limited to one five year term unless their 
performance has been exceptional (ibid.: 142). 
Rudini makes no direct reference to qualitative reforms such as the 
separation of powers between executive government, the legislature and 
the judiciary, or government prerogatives .to exclude party electoral 
candidates, although they may be inferred from his more general 
proposals. His discussion of the armed forces is cursory, with no attempt 
being made to redefine their role in the reformed structures. Moreover, 
no attempt is made to define the boundary between Rudini's liberalized 
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Pancasila state and a liberal democratic state. Where would he draw the 
line and how would it be enforced? 
In a subsequent conversation, in October 1996, General Rudini 
elaborated on some of the proposals above, making the following points: 
• dwi fungsi should not be confused with the seconding of ABRI 
personnel to government posts (kekaryawanan); these could be 
reduced or totally discontinued without detriment to the concept 
of dwi fungsi; 
• ABRI should be represented in the People's Consultative 
Assembly only; 
• ABRI should not support a political party, but the KBA [Greater 
ABRI Family] should continue to be a pillar of Golkar and 
retired ABRI members should continue to support Golkar; 
• bureaucrats should be prohibited from joining political parties, 
including Golkar, but should be free to vote for the party of 
their choice; 
• future presidents should be limited to one or two terms; 
• once elected, a president should have to resign from any political 
party offices held; 
• there was probably not sufficient cadre for three political parties 
at this stage let alone more; 
• the vetting of party candidates (litsus) should be scrapped. 
• Rudini also confirmed his support for the 'floating mass ' 
concept but did not think the name appropriate. 
Most of these points are consistent with the general tenor of his book 
but the proposal to depoliticize the bureaucracy would seem to 
undermine a vital pillar of the regime, namely the continued dominance 
of Golkar. This measure was probably included with a view to preventing 
the bureaucracy from filling the vacuum created by the proposed 
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withdrawal of ABRI from the DPR, the eventual reduction of seconded 
ABRI personnel in the bureaucracy, and the withdrawal of ABRI 
representation (by serving officers) on Golkar councils. 
Rudini is a member of Golkar and it is clear that he sees Golkar 
remaining the dominant party in the post-Suharto era. However, he has 
not articulated how he would maintain the boundaries of his liberalized 
version of the New Order. His proposals might be a significant advance 
on current conditions but it would be no easy task to carry out a major 
overhaul such as this and at the same time keep the democratizers down. 
In the face of declining legitimacy, Huntington (1991:55-57) found, 
authoritarian regimes adopted one of five options. They either ignored it, 
increased repression, provoked external conflict, adopted the semblance 
of democracy or introduced a democratic system. The first two options 
will not be available to Suharto's successors, except as short-term 
expedients. Provoking external aggression would also be more likely to 
intensify internal divisions than shore-up the regime. The liberalizers' 
approach as exemplified by Rudini is to adopt the semblance of 
democracy either as a stepping stone to democracy or to preserve the 
status quo. However, if Fukuyama is correct, the fifth option will arise in 
due course once the obstacles have been cleared. 
Given that there is no indication of the obstacles to liberal 
democracy in Malaysia and Singapore being cleared in the near future, 
why should it be expected that Indonesia will be more successful? 
Possibly because the Chinese do not represent a major political block in 
Indonesia as they do in Malaysia. Indonesian governments could adopt 
policies to assist acceptance of the Chinese minority and open business 
opportunities to all Indonesians without undermining the contribution of 
the Chinese to the nation's economic health. Unlike Singapore, 
Indonesia is a big country with a wealth of natural resources and has no 
need of the siege mentality which energizes Singapore's Chinese 
majority. The major obstacle to democracy in Indonesia remains the 
place of Islam. Given the nature of Indonesian Islam, it should not be 
beyond the capacity of Indonesia's politicians to find a workable 
solution to this problem, despite the failure of such efforts in 1957. 
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Conclusion 
There is unlikely to be any significant political reform, let alone progress 
towards liberal democracy, before Suharto departs the presidency. When, 
how and under what conditions he leaves office will depend on the 
unfolding of contending political forces in the lead-up to the presidential 
elections in March 1998 and following them if he is re-elected. 
The direction and rate of progress thereafter will largely depend on 
the attitudes adopted by ABRI in the face of increasing community 
pressure for change and reform. There appears to be support for 
liberalization within ABRI but what this entails has yet to be identified 
and agreed in any detail. However, once liberalization gets underway it 
will develop a momentum of its own and will expose the fundamental 
constitutional questions left largely unanswered by Guided Democracy 
and the New Order. None of them are irreconcilable with liberal 
democracy but they will require broad community debate and consensus. 
Meanwhile, liberalizing the current regime in the post-Suharto era 
could provide a firm base for reform and securing peaceful progress 
towards liberal democracy. Although there are substantial obstacles, it 
could occur much more quickly than now seems possible. 
Notes 
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Hyug Baeg Im (1996:279-291) provides a useful survey of the debate. 
Jacques Bertrand (1996) provides one explanation of why this is so. 
Wibisono (1997) says there are still 165 state-owned companies with 400 
subsidiaries. 
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